SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ALAMEDA

JOE A. CORONADO AND LETICIA CORONADO;

Plaintiffs

V.

AMERICAN HONDA MOTOR CO., INC., et al.

Defendants.

Case No. RG19-047581

ORDERS DENYING HONDA
DEFENDANTS' OBJECTION TO AND
MOTION TO STAY REMOTE JURY
TRIAL

On November 23, 2020 the Honda Defendants filed Objections To and Motion To Stay Remote Jury Trial. Honda objects to the use of a remote jury trial procedure, which courts have used during the COVID-19 pandemic in order to comply with social distance requirements and to proceed with a relatively limited number of civil preference jury trials.

Honda argues that remote trials are inconsistent with key aspects of California law, including problems with fairness, voir dire, judicial management and jury deliberations. Honda also argues that a remote jury trial will interfere with obtaining a representative jury pool and that a remote trial will create perils that should be vetted for feasibility before being imposed. Honda points to technological and other problems that have occurred in earlier remote jury trials. On November 30, 2020, pursuant to an agreed briefing schedule, plaintiffs filed their opposition. On December 18, 2020, the

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remote jury trial issue was argued. At that time, counsel were advised that they should expect that the case would proceed as a remote jury trial and that the court would issue a formal order denying Honda's objection. This is the promised, more formal order that addresses the issues raised in the parties' papers and arguments and that supplements the preliminary thoughts and reactions expressed and reported at the December 18, 2020 hearing.

As discussed at the hearing and in the papers, during the COVID-19 pandemic, the Alameda Superior Court has conducted a number of remote jury trials, primarily asbestos preference cases. In advance of a number of these trials, motions have been made - typically, if not entirely, by defendants - objecting to proceeding remotely. Those objections have been denied. In at least two cases in which remote jury trials have been ordered, writs have been filed with the Court of Appeal and those writs have been summarily denied. In Johnson & Johnson v. Superior Court for the County of Alameda Case No.. RG20-052391, A16035, the Court of Appeal's order stated that "entitlement to a preferential trial date safeguards a substantive right to recover damages for pain, suffering and disfigurement," emphasizing the importance of proceeding with preference jury trials where the plaintiff has a very limited life expectancy. The importance of proceeding with preference cases was further emphasized when, as the parties know, in that same Reyes v. Johnson & Johnson case, the trial ended with a mistrial because the plaintiff died of mesothelioma. The plaintiff's right to recover for pain and suffering, of course, died with him – a result that the legislature had sought to avoid when it enacted the preference statute.

In March and April 2020, following the spread of the COVID-19 virus and various shelter-in-place and social distancing health orders, the California Governor, the California Chief Justice and the California Judicial Council issued emergency orders as a result of the pandemic. Most notably for these purposes, on April 6, 2020, the Judicial Council adopted Emergency Rule 3(a), which stated, among other things, that "Notwithstanding any other law, in order to protect the health and safety of the public ... (1) Courts may require that judicial proceedings and court operations be conducted

remotely." Since then various civil remote jury trials have occurred in Alameda County and throughout the state.

There are no reported California appellate decisions that have addressed the use of remote jury trials in civil cases pursuant to the Judicial Council emergency rules. However, last week, on December 28, 2020, the Court of Appeal for the Third Appellate District issued a published opinion that reviewed the emergency rules and held that, in a juvenile delinquency case, the juvenile, like a criminal defendant under Emergency Rule 3(a)(2), must consent to a remote proceeding. *E.P. v. Superior Court of Yolo County* (December 28, 2020, Third Appellate District) 2020 WL 7693811. Notably, the Judicial Council's emergency rules authorizing courts to require remotely proceedings do not require any party's consent in a civil proceeding.¹

As to whether the court should exercise the authority to conduct a remote trial in this case, it is significant that Judge Lee on July 23, 2020 granted plaintiffs' motion for a preference trial under Code of Civil Procedure section 36 based on a professional medical opinion that due to Mr. Coronado's mesothelioma diagnosis "there is substantial medical doubt that [Mr. Coronado] will survive more than six months beyond the date of this [June 25, 2020] declaration." At the time of Judge Lee's July 23, 2020 order granting preference, it was clear that a court decision that the plaintiff in this case was entitled to a preferential trial setting meant that the trial would be conducted remotely. *See, e.g.*, Defendant Hennessy's Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion ("If Plaintiff's motion is granted, it is very likely that a preference trial via remote technology could be the only viable option.") Despite Judge Lee's July 23, 2020 order and the necessary implications of that order, Honda now objects to conducting the trial

¹ The distinction between criminal cases and civil cases and the requirement that criminal defendants consent to proceeding remotely is rooted in the Sixth Amendment's confrontation clause which provides that "in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to be confronted with the witnesses against him." The Seventh Amendment, which guarantees the right to a jury trial in civil cases, contains no similar requirement.

remotely. But no motion for reconsideration of Judge Lee's order has been made. Moreover, no motion for reconsideration could be made within the constraints set out in Code of Civil Procedure section 1008 – since, among other things, there are no new facts. To the extent that Honda's objection to a remote trial is a request for a continuance or stay of the trial until the pandemic has subsided, it is denied as an ineffective and improper motion to reconsider Judge Lee's July 23, 2020 order.²

Honda also points to problems or technical glitches that it hyperbolically describes as "insuperable problems" with remote jury trials. Honda cites, among others, two examples of problems – interruptions from parties in unrelated matters and a loss of electric laptop battery power – that, as discussed at the hearing, sometimes occur and cause minor delays during in-person trials, similar to the delays they can cause in remote trials. Honda argues that, due to potential technical problems, any remote options should be vetted for feasibility. Honda ignores the fact that court staff at this point has gained substantial experience with the use of remote technology and that the court has taken measures to assure that court staffing is appropriate and experienced so as to minimize problems and to alleviate Honda' expressed concern that it is too much for a judge to manage a trial while supervising the technology. Moreover, as also discussed at the hearing, it is expected that all counsel, parties and court staff will call to the court's attention any problem with juror inattentiveness or juror technical issues. If Honda continues to have concerns about the ability to monitor juror attentiveness, it can do what Metalclad apparently did in the *Wilgenbusch* trial – assign a paralegal or other

² Honda's argument that the preference trial that was ordered in this case could be repeatedly continued so that the trial could be conducted after the pandemic has ended is rejected. Multiple, unlimited continuances of preference trials are not permitted unless there is a showing that no courtrooms are available due to criminal trials subject to the speedy trial requirements of Penal Code section 1382 or due to conflicts with other civil preference trials. *Sprowl v. Superior Court* (1990) 219 Cal.App.3d 777, 779-781 (stating that there was no evidence that trial departments were unavailable due to criminal cases or other civil preference trials). Here, of course, this case is in line with other Alameda civil preference cases to proceed as a remote jury trial consistent with the capacity restrictions of Alameda's civil trial departments.

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team member to observe juror attentiveness on the Zoom computer displays. *See*, Honda Ex. H, Jubelier Declaration ¶ 5. Juror attentiveness issues, of course, also occur in in-person jury trial. In the court's view, the best way for counsel to address any juror attentiveness concerns is to present their case in a manner that captures and holds the jurors' attention throughout the trial.

Honda raises an issue as to whether the court can obtain a representative crosssection jury pool due to the "digital divide" and the unavailability of computers to some portions of the community. While the court agrees that a representative cross-section of the community is critically important, Alameda Superior Court has had significant experience and feedback with this and other remote jury trials issues. Based on numerous earlier remote trials, the experience has been that the juror response rate during the pandemic has been higher than normal and the vast majority of prospective jurors, which the court believes is in excess of 80-90%, already has computer access that will allow remote participation. During jury selection, those relatively few prospective jurors who do not have computer access will be required to come to the courthouse just as they would be required to appear at the courthouse in non-pandemic times and will be able to use court-provided computers in a manner that preserves social distancing. After the jury is selected and sworn, the parties have agreed to provide Chromebooks and WiFi hot spots to all seated jurors and alternates. That process in the court's view arguably is superior to an in-person jury trial where each juror sees witness testimony and demonstrative exhibits from a slightly different perspective. In a remote trial each juror is seeing testimony and exhibits from exactly the same perspective over exactly the same types of equipment.

Honda argues that there is some loss of ability to interact, to assess credibility and to pick up non-verbal cues during jury selection, witness testimony and jury deliberations. The court rejects the merits of that objection.

First, jurors today are accustomed to viewing people on movie screens, television screens and computer monitors, as well as smart phones that display facial images on Skype and Facetime and in streaming videos. Jurors are accustomed to following what

is said and in gauging the various non-verbal cues of those who appear on a screen.

Second, most non-verbal communication in the court's experience comes in the form of facial expressions, which are easily seen – probably, more easily seen on Zoom – with relatively close-up images of the face and upper body.³ Poker players – at least those who play in-person – focus on non-verbal "tells," and nearly all "tells" are related to the face and upper body, rather than the lower portion of the body, which is typically blocked by the poker table. Even an authority cited by Honda focuses on non-verbal facial cues. *See*, Honda Objection 4:22-24 ("DeWitt, *Detecting Deception During Voir Dire* (2015) vol. 39, issue 1, American J. of Trial Advocacy 25, 39 ["The face is an amazing source of information about human behaviour, as it displays emotion, pain, and divulges brain function and pathology"].)"

Third, although Honda argues that it is difficult to assess credibility if a witness is not testifying in person, parties have used video-recorded depositions to present testimony at trials for years.⁴ In recognition of the widespread use, acceptability and ease of video-recorded depositions, the legislature recently made the policy decision that video-recorded depositions could be taken remotely at the election of either the deponent or the deposing party. See, Code Civ. Proc. §2025.310. No consent of any other party is required, and that statutory change, effective on September 11, 2020, is not an interim change to address the relatively short-term consequences of the pandemic, but rather is a permanent legislative change.

Although Honda has chosen to focus on what it perceives to be the disadvantages of remote trials, there appear to be some distinct advantages to a remote trial.

³ Arguments that lower portions of the body cannot be seen in a Zoom trial ring hollow since in an in-person trial the jury box and witness box typically block much of the lower portions of the bodies of jurors or witnesses.

⁴ In fact, deposition testimony of unavailable witnesses can and often is presented to the jury by reading excerpts from the deposition transcript of the unavailable witness. In those cases, there are no non-verbal cues available to the jury, which nonetheless makes credibility determinations from the "cold transcript."

First, as mentioned above, at least some jurors who have served on both in-person juries and remote juries have reported that they prefer remote jury service because they can more easily see witnesses testify because they see a relatively close-up image that is head-on with the face of the witness, as opposed to seeing the witness from an angle dictated by the location of the jury box relative to the witness stand.

Second, in-person trials require travel by jurors, counsel and witnesses. Sometimes that travel to in-person trials involves great distances and is difficult to schedule. Many in-person trials encounter minor or significant delays when a juror, counsel or witness is late to court due to heavy traffic or an accident. Sometimes, despite warnings from the court, witnesses are not lined up outside the courtroom so as to assure continuous, uninterrupted testimony. Travel delays in an in-person trial can cause substantial disruption and they sometimes result in having the jurors dismissed early before the completion of a full trial day. Remote trials, in contrast, do not require travel and, thus, eliminate travel-related delays. It is not necessary to have witnesses waiting outside the courtroom to assure continuous testimony, and there almost never would be the need to break early for the day because the next witness is unavailable. In a remote trial, nearly all witnesses testify from their home or office, and, thus, can be "on deck" nearly continuously. As such, remote trials can avoid some of the disruptive delays to in-person trials and can better assure juror participation without disruption.

Moreover, while a remote trial is different, ⁵ there is no evidence that a remote trial adversely affects defendants more than plaintiffs. While it invariably has been a

⁵ The manner in which trial are conducted changes with the times. There was a time when jurors were routinely sequestered in high-profile criminal cases, as jurors were in *Twelve Angry Men*. Jury sequestration almost never occurs today even in high-profile criminal cases, because parties, counsel and the courts trust that jurors will abide by court directions to avoid media reports and because sequestration tends to limit jury participation. Here, a remote trial tends to enhance jury participation, particularly when pandemic health orders make in-person trials nearly impossible.

defendant that has objected to having a trial proceed remotely, it seems to the court that if there were an asymmetrical effect to a remote trial, it is more likely that a remote trial might disadvantage the plaintiff. A plaintiff who has been diagnosed with terminal mesothelioma is more likely to connect on a personal level with jurors if he or she testifies and appears in-person in the same courtroom, as opposed to appearing and testifying remotely on a screen. Moreover, as parties and counsel know, at least one of the asbestos preference trials that reached a verdict in this county, *Ocampo v. Honeywell*, was a defense verdict. *See,* "First Virtual Asbestos Trial Ends in Defense Verdict," The Recorder, September 3, 2020 https://www.law.com/therecorder/2020/09/03/first-virtual-asbestos-trial-ends-in-defense-verdict/ There is no evidence or reason to believe that the defense is disparately disadvantaged by having this case proceed as a remote trial.

During a once-in-a-century pandemic with social distance requirements and courtrooms designed for normal, relatively close, in-person proceedings, a remote trial is the only feasible option.⁶ In a preference case, where the plaintiff has a very limited life expectancy, the choice is to proceed with a remote trial, with all of the associated advantages and – in this court's view the relatively slight – disadvantages, or to deny forever Mr. Coronado's constitutional right to have his day in court. In balancing Mr. Coronado's constitutional right to have his case tried to a jury and the concerns the

⁶ At the hearing Honda's counsel expressed concern about the ability to observe jurors remotely during trial to gauge their reactions and asked how criminal trials were proceeding. As previously reported, if a defendant does not consent, criminal trials in this county are being conducted in person, but due to social distancing requirements only 3 of the 12 jurors are within easy eyesight of counsel and seated in the jury box. Nine of the 12 jurors and alternates are seated in the courtroom behind counsel. Given Honda's counsel concern about the ability to observe jurors, this is almost certainly a worse situation than conducting the trial remotely over Zoom, where all jurors will be easily visible on the computer monitors.

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Honda's defendants have raised about proceeding with a remote trial, the court concludes that proceeding with a remote trial under the circumstances created by the pandemic best balances those rights and best protects the parties' constitutional rights.

For all of the reasons described above, the Court DENIES Honda' objection to and motion to stay the remote jury trial in this action.

DATED: January 3, 2021

Richard Seabolt, Judge

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