Schaffner v. Monsanto
What’s at Stake
Whether or not federal law overrides (preempts) state-level disclosure laws for harmful chemicals.
Case Details
As a landscaper, David Schaffner spent nearly three decades working with the pesticide Roundup. In 2006, Mr. Schaffner developed non-Hodgkins lymphoma. People with heavy exposure to glyphosate, the main ingredient in Roundup, have a 41% higher chance of developing non-Hodgkins lymphoma. Mr. Schaffner and his wife filed a lawsuit against Roundup’s manufacturer Monsanto in Pennsylvania, alleging Roundup’s label violated their state’s laws against selling misbranded products that do not adequately disclose health risks.
Nearly identical cases against Monsanto have also been heard in the Eleventh and Ninth Circuits (Public Justice filed amicus briefs in both of those cases). Each time, Monsanto advanced the same argument: state-level failure to warn claims like Mr. Schaffner’s are preempted by the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA). Both of those courts ruled they were not preempted. After Monsanto appealed Mr. Schaffner’s case to the Third Circuit using the same preemption arguments, a three-judge panel split from the other circuits and ruled that the FIFRA did preempt his claims.
Mr. Schaffner petitioned the Third Circuit for a rehearing, this time in front of the full court panel (rehearing en banc). Public Justice filed an amicus brief supporting his petition, and we also filed a brief to support Mr. Schaffner before the first panel.
Unfortunately, the Third Circuit denied the petition for rehearing on September 24, 2024. Their decision doesn’t just mean a loss for this case, it could negatively impact other state law claims involving many different products governed by the FIFRA. It has also created a circuit split between the Third, and the Ninth and Eleventh.
Core Legal Questions
In our first amicus brief, we argued that under the U.S. Supreme Court decision Bates v. Dow Agrosciences, there is no preemption of his failure-to-warn claims because the FIFRA does not preempt state-law labeling requirements as long as the state’s requirements are consistent with the substantive requirements of FIFRA. Since Pennsylvania and the FIFRA share essentially the same statutory definition of misbranded products, violating the state statute is substantively equivalent to violating the federal statute.
Monsanto argued that because it had followed the EPA’s label approval process to be FIFRA-compliant, it wasn’t misbranded under FIFRA nor Pennsylvania law. The Third Circuit panel agreed.
Our second brief in this case supported Ms. Schaffner’s petition for rehearing. In that brief, we explained why the Third Circuit’s decision was not aligned with Bates—specifically that it is possible for a pesticide’s label to have been approved by EPA yet still be misbranded as a matter of federal law. The FIFRA and Bates make it clear that EPA registration is not a defense. What’s more, Congress intentionally designed the FIFRA to work in tandem with state tort law like Pennsylvania’s.
