Krupski v. Costa Crociere: A “Sleeper” Case Before the Supreme Court That Could Dramatically Impact Civil Rights Plaintiffs’ Ability to Hold Wrongdoers Accountable
By Melanie Hirsch, Public Justice Brayton-Baron Attorney
In January 2010, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Krupski v. Costa Crociere, a case that has received little attention but is likely to have a huge impact on the ability of civil rights plaintiffs to hold accountable the defendants who harmed them.
Wanda Krupski was injured while a passenger on the cruise ship Costa Magica. Upon her return, she provided notice of her injury to Costa Cruise, the entity through which she had booked her cruise and which had sent her travel documents. After unsuccessful settlement negotiations with Costa Cruise, Ms. Krupski sued. In its answer to the complaint, Costa Cruise asserted that it was merely the North American sales and booking agent for the ship operator, Costa Crociere, which was the proper defendant. Ms. Krupski accordingly amended her complaint to add Costa Crociere as a party. But Costa Crociere—represented by the same counsel as Costa Cruise—argued that it had been sued after the expiration of the one-year limitations period set by Ms. Krupski’s ticket and that the suit against it therefore could not proceed.
Whether Ms. Krupski’s case can go forward depends on a rather technical provision of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 15(c) governs the “relation back” of amendments to complaints—that is, when an amendment that would otherwise be barred by the limitations period is treated instead as though it were filed on the date of the original pleading. In particular, the rule provides that an amendment that “changes the party or the naming of a party against whom a claim is asserted” relates back if it concerns the same facts as the original pleading and if, within the period for serving the summons and complaint, the new party: (i) “received such notice of the action that it will not be prejudiced in defending on the merits; and (ii) knew or should have known that the action would have been brought against it, but for a mistake concerning the proper party’s identity.” Fed. R. Civ. P. Rule 15(c)(1)(C). In other words, if the new party was on notice that it should have been sued in the first instance, a claim against it can proceed even if the limitations period has expired.
In Ms. Krupski’s case, a tangle of related corporate entities with similar names made it difficult to determine which entity was the proper defendant until after the limitations period had expired. Ms. Krupski believed she had sued the proper entity. Both the district court and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, however, held that because Costa Crociere was listed as a “carrier” in Ms. Krupski’s 11-page ticket documentation, she was deemed to have known that Costa Crociere was a potential party at the time of filing. As a result, the initial designation of Costa Cruise as a defendant was deemed a strategic decision rather than a “mistake” within the meaning of the rule, and the courts refused to allow the amendment to relate back.
Though the question before the Court in Krupski v. Costa Crociere—what constitutes a “mistake” under Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c)(1)(C)—may seem to be technical dithering with few real-world consequences, it is important for innumerable civil rights plaintiffs. Frequently, when plaintiffs file suit, they do not know the names of the individuals responsible for their injury. To preserve their claims before the applicable limitations period expires, they name “John Doe” defendants. (One well-known example of this practice is Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), where the plaintiff did not know the names of the officers who had violated his Fourth Amendment rights.) Krupski could limit the ability of plaintiffs to amend their complaints to replace “John Does” with the actual defendants once their names are ascertained. As a result, it could dramatically circumscribe civil rights plaintiffs’ ability to obtain relief.
For example, suppose an inmate dies as a result of grievously poor medical care and the inmate’s family wishes to sue the prison and its medical personnel. At the filing stage, before discovery is available, the only way the family can obtain the names of the medical personnel who treated the inmate is through the cooperation of the prison. The prison has no incentive to cooperate; to the contrary, it benefits from prolonged obfuscation. If the prison does not cooperate, the family has no choice but to name “John Does,” seek discovery to determine the names of the medical personnel, and amend the complaint accordingly. The statute of limitations may already have passed, but Rule 15(c)(1)(C) would allow the amendment to relate back if the medical personnel already had notice of the suit such that they would not be prejudiced in defending on the merits and knew or should have known that they would be named as defendants. If the complaint adequately identifies the wrongful acts that occurred and sues prison officials, the prison will likely alert the relevant medical personnel of the suit, thereby putting them on notice within the meaning of the rule.
Nevertheless, some courts have held that naming a “John Doe” defendant in the original complaint is not, technically, a “mistake,” since the plaintiff lacked knowledge of the correct name altogether. They conclude instead that a “mistake” can only be a misnomer (i.e., spelling the defendant’s name incorrectly) or a case of mistaken identity (i.e., accidentally suing the wrong party); as such, even if the correct defendants had notice of the suit and knew that they were intended as the defendants, the suit could not proceed against them because of a technicality. If the Supreme Court follows this logic in Krupski, the consequences for civil rights plaintiffs could be devastating.
A decision for the defendants in Krupski would place a near-insurmountable burden on plaintiffs to ascertain the names of all possible defendants before filing their case. Similarly to how some courts have misinterpreted the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, --- U.S. ----, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (2009), it could bar plaintiffs from the courts unless they obtain information before suit that is only accessible through discovery. The purpose of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is “to help, not hinder, persons who have a legal right to bring their problems before the courts,” Schiavone v. Fortune, 477 U.S. 21, 27 (1986), and decisions on the merits should not be prevented by “mere technicalities.” Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 181 (1962). A ruling for the defendants in Krupski would run counter to these core principles of our system of justice. Plaintiffs’ lawyers should therefore keep a close eye on this “sleeper” case that has been hovering beneath the radar.
about the author
Melanie Hirsch is the Brayton-Baron Attorney at Public Justice. Her work at Public Justice includes authoring an amicus curiae brief in Komarova v. National Credit Acceptance and an article discussing issues that commonly arise in employment arbitrations.
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